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Abstract
This paper aims to understand under what market conditions, can competing symmetric
rms employ personalized pricing as a winning strategy. A key departure of our paper
from the literature is that we introduce customer heterogeneity in demand. If rmsdata
discloses only vertical information (demand heterogeneity), rms can only employ group
pricing. This is always a winning strategy. When data discloses horizontal information
(consumer preferences) and vertical information, perfect personalized pricing (PPP) becomes
feasible. If data only discloses horizontal information, rms can only employ imperfect
personalized pricing (IPP). By comparing uniform pricing (UP) with personalized pricing, we
show that if the share of high demand customers in the market is greater than the share of low
demand consumers, rms are always better o¤with no discrimination. More importantly, we
show that if heterogeneity in purchase quantity is su¢ ciently high, then personalized pricing
can be a winning strategy for all symmetric practice rms. If heterogeneity in consumer value
is high and the share of high demand consumers is su¢ ciently low, in comparison to UP,
both rms are better o¤ under IPP. For an intermediate share of high demand consumers,
rms can get higher prots under PPP than under UP and IPP.
JEL Code: D43, D80, L13, L40
This research has been 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Personalized Pricing is the practice where businesses may use information that is
observed, volunteered, inferred, or collected about individualsconduct or character-
istics, to set di¤erent prices to di¤erent consumers (whether on an individual or group
basis), based on what the business thinks they are willing to pay. (OFT, 2013[3])
The growth of the digital economy and the availability of big data allows businesses to look
into consumer preferences, volume purchasing habits, loyalties and other quantiable di¤erences
among customers. As data analytics and pricing algorithms become a common business practice
in digital markets, companies are increasingly able to use such tools to estimate more accurately
consumerswillingness-to-pay and engage in personalized pricing, a form of price discrimination
that involves charging di¤erent prices to consumers with di¤erent valuations.
A fundamental, but not a new question, which is of interest to practitioners, economic and
marketing scholars alike is the following: Can personalized pricing be a winning strategy in
oligopolistic markets?
Although in monopolistic markets, we can o¤er a quick yesto this question, the complexity
of oligopolistic markets suggests that in this case the answer to the question is not that easy.
As stated by Zhang (2009) on a revision on targeted/personalized pricing, the simple answer to
a question like this is it depends. This is, of course, the easy part of the answer. The di¢ cult
part is to gure out what it depends on.
The aim of this paper is to complement the extant literature on personalized pricing, by
assessing the prot e¤ects of personalized pricing in markets where businesses face consumers,
which are heterogeneous in terms of tastes and purchase quantity. Many researchers such as
Thisse and Vives (1988), Sha¤er and Zhang (1995), Bester and Petrakis (1996) and Matsumura
and Matsushima (2015) have already looked at this question, focusing on personalized pricing
in horizontal product di¤erentiated markets with equally valuable consumers. All of these the-
oretical studies have come to the same conclusion: Personalized pricing based on data about
consumer preferences, leads symmetric practicing rms to become worse o¤. As pointed out
by Corts (1998, p. 321), Competitive price discrimination may intensify competition by giv-
ing rms more weapons with which to wage their war.When competing symmetric rms all
have access to the required data to employ personalized pricing, they can target each others
customers with great accuracy and e¢ ciency, and consequently, each individual customer is a
market to be contested. For that reason, the intensity of price competition reduces all prices to
the detriment of rms.
Back in 2017, The Economist published a story titled, The worlds most valuable resource
is no longer oil, but data(Parkins, D., 2017). No one ignores that data is an important input
of rmstargeted pricing and/or advertising strategies. However, why would companies be so
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eager to collect data for pricing if by doing so they become worse o¤? Of course, because, under
some market conditions, data-based pricing is employed by rms as a winning strategy. The
extension of previous studies to asymmetric rms with regard to cost of targeting, more loyal
customers, vertical di¤erentiation, cost reducing activities, have shown that personalized pricing
can be a winning strategy, at least for one of the rms (e.g. Sha¤er and Zhang, 2002; Ghose
and Huang, 2009; Matsumura and Matsushima, 2015).
While the economic and marketing literature has generated important theoretical insights
regarding personalized pricing in oligopolistic markets, there still are a number of unanswered
questions. To our knowledge little is known about the prot implications of quoting personalized
prices in symmetric markets where not all customers are equally valuable for rms, i.e., when
some customers purchase more units than others. In light of this, the aim of this paper is to
investigate under what conditions yes can arise as the answer to the previous question in
contexts where symmetric rms face a proportion of (H)igh and (L)ow-type demand customers
with horizontal preferences for their products.
Modeling customer heterogeneity in terms of preferences and purchase quantity allows rms
to gain a new dimension of information, in comparison to previous studies (e.g. Thisse and
Vives, 1988; Matsmura and Matsushima, 2015). In other words, in addition to data revealing
what brand they prefer(horizontal information), businessesdata can also reveal information
pertaining to how much they buy(vertical information).
Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2006) note that more information in symmetric markets where
rms price discriminate according to consumer preferences data, will lead to more intense com-
petition between rms at the expense of prots. An additional contribution of this paper is to
investigate under what conditions are practice rms better o¤ with less or more information
about consumers. In other words, are rms better o¤ with access to data disclosing vertical or
horizontal information or both?
With this goal in mind, we build a game theoretical model with two rms selling a horizontal
di¤erentiated product to consumers, which are heterogeneous with regard to two dimensions:
(i) brand preferences (horizontal dimension) and (ii) purchase quantity (vertical dimension).
Consumer preferences for each product is represented by x 2 [0; 1]. Firm A is located at 0 and
B at 1. A key departure of our paper from the personalized pricing literature is that we adapt
the Hotelling model to introduce customer heterogeneity in demand: a H(igh)-type consumer
purchases q > 1 units of the good and a L(ow)-type segment that purchases only one unit, q = 1.
We compare the no information/uniform pricing benchmark, with three di¤erent data-
driven price discrimination schemes. Most often personalized pricing is associated to rst-
degree or perfectprice discrimination. We take this view in this paper too. In the extreme
case where rms data discloses perfect information about the two dimensions of consumer
heterogeneity demand types and individual preferences rms are able to employ a Perfect
Personalized Pricing (henceforth, PPP) scheme. Obviously, we do not exclude (perhaps) more
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realistic pricing practices where rmsdata does not reveal full information about the two di-
mensions. In light of this, we consider the case where rmsdata reveals information about
consumer preferences but not about demand heterogeneity. Because each consumer demand
type is not revealed, rms can only employ an Imperfect Personalized Pricing (henceforth, IPP)
strategy. Likewise, when data available is more limited, it is also possible that data-based pricing
discriminates groups instead of individuals, thus resulting in group pricing (henceforth, GP). We
also allow for this possibility, when each rms user data discloses information about consumer
demand heterogeneity but not about individual preferences.
Our analysis highlights that whether price discrimination based on consumer data is good
or bad for prots, depends on the type of information disclosed by rmsdata and the market
conditions. We show that symmetric competing rms might all become better o¤ with informa-
tion about consumers. If rmsdata is limited and discloses only vertical information (demand
heterogeneity), then, in comparison to no discrimination, group pricing is always a winning
strategy. The benet of this price discrimination scheme is higher in markets characterized by
high demand heterogeneity and a low (high) share of H(L)-type consumers. Furthermore, rms
are always strictly better o¤ under group pricing than under imperfect or perfect personalized
pricing.
More importantly, we add to the literature a model showing that personalized pricing (perfect
or imperfect) might be a winning strategy for all symmetric practice rms. When heterogeneity
in purchase quantity is low and/or the share of H-type consumers is higher than the share of L-
type consumers, practice rms are always worse o¤ with perfect/imperfect personalized pricing
than with uniform pricing. This result is consistent with existing theoretical models.
In contrast, when heterogeneity in purchase quantity is su¢ ciently high and the proportion of
H-type consumers is su¢ ciently low, in comparison to no discrimination, all rms can be better
o¤ under personalized pricing. The intuition behind this result is as follows. Under uniform
pricing, when heterogeneity in purchase quantity increases, rms charge lower prices and prots
fall. A lower price due to higher q leads to a small reduction in prots from the H-type segment,
because the increase in demand compensates the reduction in price. In contrast, the reduction
in prots in the L-type segment is stronger because the lower price is not compensated by
more demand. Thus, the negative e¤ect of an increase in q on overall prots is greater the lower
(higher) is the proportion of H(L)-type consumers in the market. Under these market conditions,
access to data for personalized pricing might act to soften price competition to the benet of
rms. When q is high and the proportion of H (L)-type consumers is su¢ ciently small (high),
practice rms are better o¤ under imperfect than under perfect personalized pricing, i.e., when
data only reveals horizontal information, i.e. information about tastes. However, prots can also
be higher under perfect personalized pricing (horizontal and vertical information) than under
imperfect personalized pricing. This happens when q is high and the share of H-type consumers
is intermediate (but lower than the share of L-type consumers). Summing up, in oligopolistic
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markets characterized by a high enough heterogeneity in consumer value and a higher share
of L-type consumers, PPP can be the winning strategy if the share of H-type consumers is
intermediate; IPP is the winning strategy when the share of H-type (L-type) consumers is
su¢ ciently small (high).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature. The
model is presented in Section 3. The benchmark case of uniform pricing is discussed in Section 4.
Section 5 presents the equilibrium analysis for the three di¤erent price discrimination schemes,
namely group pricing, imperfect and perfect personalized pricing. Section 6 discusses the price
and prot e¤ects of di¤erent pricing schemes. Final remarks appear in Section 7. All the proofs
are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Relevant Literature
This paper is related to the broad literature on competitive price discrimination based customer
recognition (i.e., based on consumer data). Some studies have focused the analysis in static
frameworks, while others in dynamic settings where rms recognize consumers after the rst-
period purchase behavior is revealed. This later form of price discrimination has been termed
Behavior-Based Price Discrimination (e.g. Chen, 1997; Villas-Boas, 1999; Fudenberg and Tirole,
2000; Esteves, 2010, to name few). In all of these approaches, prots fall down with price
discrimination. Under BBPD, one explicitly models how past purchase behavior provides rms
with information about preferences, which are then used to determine discriminatory prices in
the future. Unlike BBPD settings, models of personalized/targeted prices are in general static,
and rms discriminate among consumers based on perfect or noisy information about their
underlying preferences.
Our work aligns closely to the static theoretical literature on personalized pricing (Thisse and
Vives, 1988; Sha¤er and Zhang, 1995; Bester and Petrakis, 1996; Matsumura and Matsushima,
2015). So far, the literature has mostly focused on preference-based pricing, which means that,
according to the terminology of Corts (1998), the market exhibits best-response asymmetry.
Like Thisse and Vives (1988) we assume that there are two rms located at the extremes of the
segment [0; 1] : Consumers are uniformly distributed in the line segment and rms can observe
the location (or brand preference) of each individual consumer and price accordingly. With
symmetric rms and no consumer heterogeneity in demand, o¤ering personalized prices, while
being optimal for each practicing rm, makes all rms worse o¤ . Thus, in either static or
dynamic contexts, price discrimination based on consumer preferences data is generally bad for
prots when all practice rms are symmetric and learn the same about consumers.
Other studies tell us that this conclusion is not inevitable. In static settings, the rationale for
the positive e¤ect of competitive price discrimination on prots may lie on rmsasymmetry (e.g.
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Sha¤er and Zhang, 2002; Ghose and Huang, 2009; and Matsumura and Matsushima, 2015),1 ;2
multi-dimensional product di¤erentiation (e.g. Esteves, 2009b)3 or imperfect targetability (Chen
et al, 2001).4 In dynamic settings, prots may increase with BBPD due to imperfect correlated
preferences across time (Chen and Pearcy, 2010, and Shin and Sudhir, 2010), consumersdemand
heterogeneity (Shin and Sudhir, 2010), heterogeneity in price sensitivity (Colombo, 2018), non-
uniform distribution of consumer preferences (Esteves et al, 2020), imperfect informed consumers
(Chen and Zhang 2009, Esteves, 2009a, and Esteves and Resende, 2016, 2019).
The aim of this article is to extend the analysis of personalized pricing to a situation where
there are two sources of consumer heterogeneity: (i) horizontal preferences for rms and (ii)
purchase quantity. Shin and Sudhir (2010) use a similar approach for consumer heterogeneity
in demand in a dynamic BBPD model. Our model is di¤erent from theirs in several respects.
First, they explicitly model how past purchase behavior provides rms with information about
preferences and demand heterogeneity, which are then used to determine discriminatory prices
in the future. We do not model how rms obtain such information. In their BBPD model,
rst-period choices allow rms to segment consumers into a strong (own customers) and a weak
(rivals customers) segment customers. Additionally, in the second-period, information about
the vertical dimension is asymmetric, because each rm recognizes H and L type consumers
only in its own customers. Therefore, customer heterogeneity in purchase quantity confers an
endogenous information advantage of companies about their current customers.5 As we allow
rms to rely on the same piece of information about existing/potential customerspreferences
and/or demand types, we exclude information asymmetry from our analysis. Finally, while in
their model, rms o¤er a price to its own and rivals customers, here depending on the ex-ante
available data, rms can o¤er group or personalized prices. By so doing, our analysis sheds
light about the impact of consumer value heterogeneity and the share of Low and High demand
1Sha¤er and Zhang (2002) consider both horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation, with a positive cost of targeting
customers. They show that the rm with more loyal customers can earn higher prots in equilibrium when both
rms engage in one-to-one promotions.
2Matsumura and Matsushima (2015) allow rms to engage in cost-reducing activities after determining their
pricing policies, personalized or uniform pricing. They show that when the ex ante cost di¤erence between the
two rms is large, employing personalized pricing harms the less-e¢ cient rm even when employing this pricing
is costless. This result does not hold when the rms do not engage in cost-reducing activities.
3 In Esteves (2009b) consumer horizontal preferences are two-dimensional. When rms quote prices based on
partial information, they might become better o¤ under personalized pricing than under uniform pricing.
4Chen et al. (2001) consider the case where consumer information is noisy; hence, targeting is imperfect. At
low levels of accuracy, the positive e¤ect of price discrimination on prot is stronger, whereas at high levels, the
negative e¤ect of competition on prot is stronger. Overall, prots are greatest at moderate levels of accuracy.
5Another important paper in the context of BBPD is Colombo (2018). Consumers are heterogeneous both in
tastes and in price sensitivity. Each rm is able to distinguish between the consumers that have bought from it
and those that have bought from the rival. Information about price sensitivity is asymmetric, because each rm
can only learn the price sensitivity of its own consumers. The author shows that using this additional information
may yield higher prots than uniform pricing provided that consumers are heterogeneous enough with respect to
price sensitivity.
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consumers, on the protability of each information/pricing settings, namely (i) group pricing
(data discloses information only about demand types), (ii) imperfect personalized pricing (data
discloses information only about preferences) and (iii) perfect personalized pricing (data discloses
information about demand types and preferences).6
3 The model
Consider a market with two rms, A and B, producing at zero marginal cost7 a di¤erentiated
product. The product produced by rm A and B is located at 0 and 1, respectively. There is a
continuum of consumers with mass normalized to 1. Consumers are heterogeneous with regard
to two dimensions: (i) brand preferences (horizontal dimension) and (ii) demand or purchase
quantities (vertical dimension). Consumer preferences for each product is represented by x
uniformly distributed along the Hotelling line, x  U [0; 1]. A consumer located at x incurs a
desutility cost equal to x if she buys product A, while this cost is (1   x) if she buys product
B. A key departure of our model from the literature on personalized pricing focusing on brand
preferences (e.g. Thisse and Vives, 1988; and Matsumura and Matsushima, 2015) is that we
adapt the Hotelling model to introduce customer heterogeneity in demand. Specically, we
assume there are two types of consumers in the market, j 2 fL;Hg: a H(igh)-type segment
that purchases q > 1 units of the good and a L(ow)-type segment that purchases only one
unit, i.e., q = 1. Shin and Sudhir (2010) use a similar assumption to model consumer value
heterogeneity but in a behavior-based price discrimination model. The proportion of L and H
type consumers is the market is, respectively,  and 1  ; with 0 <  < 1: A consumer of type
j purchasing from A at price pA obtains a surplus of
Qj(v   pA)  x; (1)
while if purchasing from B at price pB she obtains a surplus equal to
Qj(v   pB)  (1  x); (2)
where QH = q and QL = 1. We also assume that the gross utility from consuming the di¤eren-
tiated product v is large enough so that the market is covered.
6Colombo (2016) allows BBPD to be perfect and imperfect. By perfectBBPD he means that, once consumers
have done their initial choice by choosing one rm, the rms are then able to recognize from which rm each
consumer has bought. Under imperfect BBPD the information rms receive about consumerspast purchases is
incomplete, that is, it does not cover all consumers. Imperfect price discrimination in Chen et al. (2001) and
Esteves (2014) means that all consumers are classied with some noise as loyal to one rm or to the other. In
Liu and Serfes (2004) and Colombo (2011) all consumers are classied (correctly) into a number of subsegments
within the Hoteling line and the imperfectness stems from the dimension of each subsegment.
7The assumption of zero marginal costs can be relaxed without altering the basic nature of the results derived
throughout the model.
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Firms set their prices simultaneously and non-cooperatively. Based on what rms can learn
from their available data, we consider three symmetric data-based pricing strategies. In the ex-
treme case where rmsdata discloses perfect information about the two dimensions of consumer
heterogeneity demand types and individual preferences rms are able to employ a Perfect Per-
sonalized Pricing (PPP) scheme. In this case, each rm charges each consumer a personalized
price, namely pji (x); with j = L;H and i = A;B: We also take into account perhaps more
realistic practices, in which rmsdata does not reveal full information about the two dimen-
sions of consumer heterogeneity. In light of this, we consider the case where rmsdata only
reveals information about one of the two dimensions. When data discloses information about
individual tastes but not about demand types, each rm can only employ an Imperfect Person-
alized Pricing (IPP) strategy. In this setting, each rm chooses an individual preference-based
price, i.e., pi(x); i = A;B: Finally, when information is even more limited in the sense that the
available data only reveals information about consumer types, rms can only price discriminate
on a group rather than on an individual basis, thus employing a group pricing (GP) strategy.
We look at this possibility when each rms data discloses information about consumer demand
heterogeneity but not about individual preferences. Firms segment consumers in two groups
and price accordingly. In other words, rm i chooses price pji with j = L;H and i = A;B:
4 Benchmark: Uniform pricing
To isolate the e¤ect of group and personalized pricing on prots, let us rst establish the bench-
mark of uniform pricing where each rm can only charge one price to all consumers. Let puA
and puB denote the uniform prices set by rm A and B, respectively. A j   type consumer is
indi¤erent between buying from the two rms if she is located at bxj , such that
Qj(v   pA)  bxj = Qj(v   pB)  (1  bxj):









q (pB   pA)
2
: (4)



















































Proposition 1: Under uniform pricing in the symmetric NE:
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(i) each rm charges pu equal to
pu =
+ q(1  )
+ q2(1  ) ; and, (7)





+ q2(1  ) : (8)
Proof. See the Appendix.
When rms have no information about consumerstypes and preferences and/or when price
discrimination is not permitted they are forced to quote the same price to all consumers. As
expected, when all consumers demand q = 1 we get the standard Hotelling results, the uniform
price is pu = 1 and prots per rm are u = 12 :
From the equilibrium uniform pricing, we conclude that when H-type consumers demand




heterogeneity in purchase quantity increases, rms price more aggressively, reducing the equi-
librium uniform price. In terms of prots, the reduction in price is compensated by selling more
units to H-type consumers. Thus, a reduction in pu; due to higher q; has a smaller e¤ect on
overall uniform prot if the share of H-type consumers is high ( low). Regarding the e¤ect
of  on the uniform price, we conclude that @p
u
@ > 0:
9 The reason is that an increase in the
proportion of L-type consumers in the market softens price competition, thus for the same q
rms have fewer incentives to reduce pu when the proportion of H-type consumers falls.
Under uniform pricing, when heterogeneity in purchase quantity increases, rms charge lower
prices and prots fall (@
u
@q < 0). A lower price due to higher q leads to a small reduction in
prots from the H-type segment, because the increase in demand compensates the reduction in
price. In contrast, the reduction in prots in the L-type segment is stronger because the lower
price is not compensated by more demand. Therefore, the negative e¤ect of an increase in q
on overall prots is greater the lower (higher) is the proportion of H(L)-type consumers in the
market. Specically, regarding the e¤ect of  on prots, we nd that @
u
@ < 0 when  < e;
while @
u
@ > 0 when  > e; with e = qq+1 : As q > 1 then e > 12 : As the proportion of L-type
consumers increases, rms have lower incentives to reduce the uniform price. In fact, when
! 1, pu ! 1 and u ! 12 :
5 Equilibrium analysis of di¤erent price discrimination schemes
While for a long time perfect price discrimination was considered a highly theoretical concept,












> 0 for q > 1:
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attempt to improve their knowledge of customers. To perfectly price discriminate, a rm must
be able to use an algorithm that base on rms user data can identify each consumers exact
valuation. So one important impediment to perfect personalized pricing is insu¢ cient data.
As aforementioned, our aim is to o¤er a complete picture of rmsprice decisions and prot
implications under insu¢ cient data group pricing or imperfect personalized pricing  and un-
der su¢ cient data to produce perfect estimates of consumersvaluations perfect personalized
pricing.
In what follows we consider three information/pricing settings. In the rst two cases, we
assume that rms data is insu¢ cient, in other words data discloses information only about
one of the two dimensions of consumer heterogeneity. When data only reveals consumer de-
mand types, rms discriminate by groups and not by individuals (GP). Then, we consider the
case where rmsdata reveals information about consumer preferences but not about demand
heterogeneity. In this case, each rms directly observes the location of each consumer in the
preference line, i.e. x; and can o¤er a preference-based individual price to each consumer, i.e.
pi (x). As demand types are unknown, we call this price strategy, as Imperfect Personalized
Pricing (IPP). Finally, we consider the extreme (perhaps less realistic) case where rmsdata is
rich enough to disclose perfect information about the two dimensions of consumer heterogeneity,
i.e., consumerspreferences and demand types, meaning that algorithms identify perfectly each
customers reservation value. In this situation, Perfect Personalized Pricing (PPP) becomes
possible.
5.1 Group pricing
Under group pricing rms segment consumers in two groups (H and L), so each rm sets a price
to a H and a L type consumer, respectively denoted pHi and p
L
i ; i = A;B: Using equations (3)
























Similar expressions hold for rm B. Taking the rst order conditions and solving for prices we
can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Group pricing): When rmsdata only reveals consumer demand types,
rms compete with group pricing and in the NE:
(i) each rm quotes, respectively, the following prices to Low and High type consumers:










Proof. See the Appendix.
In this situation, with price discrimination there is best-response symmetry. Following Corts
(1998), best-response symmetry simply requires that both rms rank the same group of con-
sumers as the strong market. Under group pricing, both rms are unanimous with regard to the
price targeted to low and high type consumers. As in the traditional literature, in models ex-
hibiting best-response symmetry, price discrimination leads to an increase in price to one group
and to a decrease in price to the other group. In line of this, as established in Corollary 1, the
comparison between no discriminatory and discriminatory prices is clear: with group pricing
rms price high to the Low demand consumers and price low to the High demand consumers,
exactly as one would expect. Thus, with group pricing H-type consumers are better o¤, while
L-type consumers are worse o¤.
Corollary 1: In comparison to uniform pricing, when rms data only allow for group
pricing:
(i) Low demand consumers pay higher prices and High demand consumers pay lower prices.
(ii) Prots increase at the expense of consumers.
Proof. See the Appendix.
5.2 Imperfect personalized pricing
Now we assume that rmsdata discloses perfect information about each consumer location x but
discloses no information about consumersdemand types. In line of this, each rm tailors o¤ers
based on each consumers location x, i.e. pi(x); i = A;B: Now following Corts (1998), with price
discrimination the model exhibits best-response asymmetry because one rms strongmarket
is the others weakmarket. Consumers with preferences in the interval x  12 belong to rm
Astrong market and to rm Bs weak market. The reverse happens to consumers located at
x > 12 : Thus, with price discrimination, each rm wants to increase the price to its nearby
consumers (strong market) and to reduce the price to far away consumers (weak market).
With no loss of generality consider the case where x  12 : Given pA(x) and pB(x); a consumer
of type L is indi¤erent between A and B as long as
pA(x) = pB(x) + (1  2x) or pA(x) = pB(x) + (x)
with (x) = (1  2x): A consumer of type H is indi¤erent between A and B as long as
pA(x) = pB(x) +
1  2x
q




Note that (x) > (x)q :
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We rst consider the case where the market is composed by a high enough share of High
demand consumers.
High proportion of H-type consumers in the market (low ) : The next proposition
shows that when the proportion of High demand consumers in the market is high ( is low),
rm A tailors pA(x) =
(x)
q to consumers in its strong market, while rm B quotes pB(x) = 0
to consumers in its weak market: Given the symmetry of the model, similar arguments apply to
rmsprice decisions to consumers located at x > 12 :
Proposition 3. (Imperfect Personalized Pricing  low): Suppose   b with b =
q
2q 1 : If rms can only personalize prices based on consumer preferences, there is a NE in pure
strategies in which:




q for x 
1
2





q for x 
1
2
0 for x < 12
:
(ii) Each rm prot is
IPP =
+ (1  ) q
4q
: (12)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Because each rm cannot distinguish a L/H-type consumer in its strong market, it prices
low, i.e., according to the highest price that just prevents H-type consumers from being tempted
by the rival o¤er (in the case of x  12 ; pA(x) =
1 2x
q ). This happens as as long as the gain from
selling to both types of customers through a low price is greater than the gain from pricing high
to L-type consumers and selling for sure to these group of customers. This depends of course, on
the share of each consumer type, specically when the share of High (Low) value consumers in
the market is su¢ ciently high (low), i.e, when   b = q2q 1 : Note that @b@q < 0 and limq!+1b = 12 .
When the proportion of L and H types in the market is the same ( = 12), rms always behave
as in Proposition 3. Before proceeding note that consistent with Thisse and Vives (1988), when
x  12 and consumers are equally valuable (q = 1) we get pA(x) = 1  2x and pB(x) = 0:
Next we look at the case in which the proportion of High demand consumers in the market
is low or, equivalently, the proportion of Low demand consumers is high.
Low proportion of H-type consumers (high ): Following a reasoning similar to
Narasimhan (1988), when  > b = q2q 1 we can show that a pure strategy in prices fails to
exist: There is, however, an asymmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in prices, the existence of
which is proved by construction. In this equilibrium, each rm uses a price strategy that pre-
vents its opponent from predicting its price setting behavior, which in turn makes undercutting
less likely.
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With no loss of generality consider next each rm price decisions for consumers located
at x  12 (rm As strong market and rm Bs weak market). (Similar reasoning holds for
consumers located at x  12 ; rm Bs strong market and rm As weak market). The minimum
price rm A is willing to charge to a consumer located at x in an attempt to serve a L/H type




+ (1  )q : (13)
Firm B takes into account rm As behavior and so the minimum price it is willing to quote
to the same consumer in an attempt to sell to H-type consumers is pBmin(x) = pAmin(x)  (x)q .
Suppose that rm i selects a price randomly from the c.d.f Fi(pj(x)): For a consumer located at
x < 12 in the MSNE we must observe:























= (1  )qpBmin(x): (15)
After some computations presented in the Appendix we can establish the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 4 (Imperfect Personalized Pricing  high): When the proportion of
Low-type consumers in the market is su¢ ciently high, i.e. when  > b with b = q2q 1 in the
MSNE for a consumer located at x < 12 :
(i) Firm A chooses the price pA(x) randomly from the distribution function:
FA [p(x)] = 1 
(2q   1)  q
[p(x)q   (x)] [q(1  ) + ](x) (16)
with a mass point m = (2q 1) q(q 1)(q(1 )+) : With
pAmin(x) =
(x)
+ q (1  ) ; (17)
pAmax(x) = (x): (18)
(ii) Firm B chooses the price pB(x) randomly from the distribution function:
FB [p(x)] =
+ (1  )q
q (1  )  
(x)
















Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 highlights that in rm As strong market, prices fall with x; i.e., consumers
with stronger preferences for rm A will be charged higher prices. In other words, rm A will set
a high price to nearby consumers (lower x and higher (x)) in order to exploit those consumers
unwillingness to travel so far to the other rm. Like in Thisse and Vives (1988) consumers in
the middle, with (x) = 0; will always receive the better deals, in fact they will pay the marginal
cost price, i.e. p(x = 12) = 0: The same happens here.
Interestingly, Proposition 4 highlights that consumers with strong preferences for each rm
will be charged the highest price by both rms. Note that the highest price in the support of
rm As equilibrium price targeted to a consumer located at x; only depends on the consumer
preference parameter x: The stronger is the consumer preference for rm A (lower x ) higher
(x)) the higher will be the expected price quoted by rm A to that consumer. In contrast to
what happens in Thisse and Vives (1988) and Proposition 3, in this case rm B charges a higher
expected price to a consumer located near the rival than to a consumer located near the centre.
Note that for x  12 ; the minimum and maximum prices of each rm support are higher the
lower is x:






suggesting that the lower is the heterogeneity in purchase quantity (lower q), the higher will
be the probability of rm A charging the highest price (x) to a consumer located at x: On
the other hand, taking into account the support of rm Bs equilibrium price distribution, we
conclude that pBmax(x) always increases with q: Note that the higher is q the lower is
(x)
q and
so the higher is pBmax(x) = (x)   (x)q . Regarding the e¤ect of changes in q on pBmin(x); we
conclude that when q < 4, @pBmin(x)@q > 0, while the reverse happens when q > 4:
11 Thus, for
high enough heterogeneity in consumer demand, an increase in q also increases pBmin(x):
Additionally, since  > b; further increases in  only a¤ect the minimum price of the
support of each rms equilibrium price distribution. Specically, an increase (decrease) in the
proportion of L (H) type consumers increases the minimum price rm A is willing to charge in
equilibrium and also rms B minimum price. From the expression of the mass point we can
see that @m@ =
q2
(q 1)(q+ q)2 > 0. Therefore, when  > b; an increase in the proportion of L
type consumers, increases the probability with which rm A charges the highest price to the
consumer located at x:
From Proposition 4, it follows that for a consumer with preference x located at x  12 , rm
As expected prot is:
A(x) = (x):
10This iinequality holds as long as  > q
2(q 1) ; which is always true given that  > b:














while rm Bs expected prot is:
B(x) =
(1  ) [(2q   1)  q]
+ q(1  ) (x);


















(1  ) ((2q   1)  q)
+ q(1  ) : (21)
Under personalized prices with equally valuable consumers (and also here under Proposition
3), in spite of lower prices o¤ered to consumers in a rms weak market, no consumer switches to
the more distant rm. Thus, each rms prot from its weak market is zero. Here, in contrast,
with some probability H-type consumers with a preference say for rm A decide to purchase
from rm B. Thus, when  > b; rm Bs prot from its weak market is no longer null.
A similar reasoning applies to both rmsprice o¤ers and respective prots to consumers
located at x > 12 : In line of this, due to symmetry, we can establish that when the proportion
of Low (High) type consumers in the market is su¢ ciently high (low), i.e., when  > q2q 1 ; each







(1  ) ((2q   1)  q)
+ q(1  ) : (22)
5.3 Perfect personalized pricing
Now we assume that both rmsuser data discloses full information about consumerspreferences
and demand types, which implies that perfect personalized pricing becomes a possibility to both
rms. Hence, for a consumer located at x each rm quotes pji (x); with j = L;H: Consider, for




B(x); a consumer of type L located
at x is indi¤erent between buying from A or B as long as pLA(x) + x = p
L
B(x) + (1  x): The best
price rm B can o¤er to a consumer with a preference for A is pLB(x) = 0: Therefore, in order
not to lose this consumer, rm A needs to quote pLA(x) = (x). Doing the same for a consumer
located at x > 12 ; we get that p
L
B(x) =  (x): We do the same for a consumer of type H: Then,
we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 5: When both rms have perfect information about each consumer demand
type and tastes, they are able to employ perfect personalized pricing and in the NE:
(i) each rm quotes:
pLA(x) =
(
1  2x for x  12
0 for x > 12
and pLB(x) =
(
2x  1 for x  12






q for x 
1
2
0 for x > 12
and pHB (x) =
(
2x 1
q for x 
1
2
0 for x < 12
(24)





6 Price and prot e¤ects
This section discusses the price and prot e¤ects of data-based pricing in the three informa-
tion/pricing schemes presented above.
6.1 Price e¤ects
Most of the existing literature on competitive price discrimination suggests that when the market
exhibits best-response asymmetry, the optimal choice for each rm is to o¤er a lower price to
consumers in its weak market (with a preference for the rival) than to consumers in its strong
market (e.g. Thisse and Vives, 1988; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000). Furthermore, in comparison
to uniform pricing, due to the all-out competition result, all prices fall under price discrimination.
In what follows we compare rmsprice behavior under price discrimination and uniform pricing.
Corollary 1 (U versus GP) highlights that when rmsdata discloses vertical information
(H/L types), both rms agree in their price decisions to each segment: they want to raise the
price targeted to L-type consumers and reduce the price targeted to H-type consumers. In line
of this, in comparison to uniform pricing, Low demand consumers pay higher prices and High
demand consumers pay lower prices (i.e., pH < pU < pL). Consequently, under group pricing,
H-type consumers are made better o¤, while L-type consumers are made worse o¤.
Consider now the extreme case where rms have all the required information to engage in
perfect price discrimination. The relation among prices targeted to H-type consumers is
pH(x) < pu: (26)
Furthermore, from the comparison among uniform, group and perfect personalized pricing, it
follows that with the exception of consumers with x = 0 and x = 1; who pay the same price
under GP and PPP the relation between prices targeted to H-type consumers is as follows:
pH(x)  pH < pu: (27)
Concerning the price charged to L-type consumers under PPP and GP it follows that pL(x)  pL.
Again, with exception of consumers with x = 0 and x = 1; who pay the same price under GP
and PPP, all the others pay lower prices under PPP than under GP. If we compare the price
charged to Low demand consumers under uniform and perfect personalized pricing we conclude
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that for consumers located at x  12 :
pu < pL(x) when 0 < x  bx (28)
pu > pL(x) when bx < x < 1
2
: (29)
with bx = 12 q(1 )(q 1)+q2(1 ) < 12 :
In sum, although H-type consumers are always better o¤ under PPP than under UP,12 the
same is not always true at least for some of L-type consumers who can be harmed by the ability of
rms to recognize them and price accordingly, either under GP or PPP. More specically, L-type
consumers with preferences x 2 [0; bx] are better o¤ with UP than with PPP, while consumers
with preferences x 2
bx; 12 are better o¤ with PPP than with UP. Like in Thisse and Vives
(1988), when q = 1; all consumers are better o¤ under PPP than under UP (indeed, consumers
with x = 0 pay the same price under PPP and UP).
As @bx@ < 0; the higher is the proportion of H-type consumers in the market (lower ), the
lower will be pu and so the higher is the threshold bx: When this happens a higher share of Low
type consumers are better o¤ if rms cannot use their data for price personalization. The same






In what follows we compare prices under UP, GP and IPP. Consider rst the case in which
the proportion of H-type consumers is su¢ ciently high. In other words, suppose  < b = q2q 1
holds and rms behave as in Proposition 3. A consumer located at x; with x  12 is charged
pIPPA (x) =
1 2x
q and pB(x) = 0: In this case, H-type consumer with preference x is o¤ered the
same price under IPP and PPP, then she is better o¤ under personalized pricing than under
uniform pricing. Put di¤erently:
pIPP (x)  pH < pu,
with pIPP (x) = (x)q : Because in this situation L-type consumers are also charged p
IPP =
(x)
q ; they are also better o¤ under IPP. Thus, L-type consumers can buy at lower prices as q
increases. Looking for instance at consumers located at x  12 ; we can show that:
pIPP (x) < pL(x) < pu if bx < x < 1
2
;
pIPP (x) < pu < pL(x) if 0 < x  bx:
Therefore, in comparison to UP and IPP, L-type consumers pay always lower prices under
IPP than under UP if the share of H-type consumers in the market is su¢ ciently high. Finally,
we look at the case where the market is composed by high (low) enough share of L-type (H-type)
consumers. In other words, suppose that  > b with b = q2q 1 holds. We have seen that in this
12Consider for instance a consumer located at x  1
2
: Specically, pu > pH(x) as long as x >   (q 1)
+q2(1 ) ;
which is always true.
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situation, rms set their prices randomly. Due to symmetry, consider rmspricing decisions
to consumers with preferences located at x < 12 : (Note that consumers located at x =
1
2 are
charged 0 by both rms in equilibrium.)









The support of rm Bs equilibrium price is pB(x) 2 [pBmin(x); pBmax(x)] with
pBmin(x) = (x)

(2q   1)  q










Because  > b then pBmin(x) > 0 for consumers located at x < 12 ((x) > 0): Interestingly,
as consumer preferences for brand A are stronger (lower x), (x) also increases and the minimum
and maximum prices in the support of both rmsequilibrium price distributions increase.
The uniform price is pu = +q(1 )
+q2(1 ) . Note that
@pu
@ > 0 when  > e; with e = qq+1 ;
otherwise if  < e then @pu@ < 0. When q > 2; we conclude that b < e; therefore an increase in
 reduces the uniform price if b <  < e: When  > e; then pu can increase with :
Consider both rmsprice behavior for consumers located at x  12 : Firm A uses a Hi-
Lo pricing strategy. L-type consumers will always buy from A. With probability equal to m
they pay (x); otherwise they can pay a lower price. Nevertheless, depending on x, q and  the
discriminatory price can be above or below its uniform counterpart. When demand heterogeneity
and the proportion of Low type consumers are high, the uniform price falls drastically. This
suggests that for small x (high (x)) the discriminating price can be above the uniform one.
Even though it is not possible to establish a general stochastic ordering between FA [p(x)]
and FB [p(x)] ; we plot the cumulative distribution functions for x < 12 ; assuming that  >
q
2q 1 :
The gures are plotted for x = f0; 0:25g ; q = f6; 15g and  = f0:6; 0:8g :
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Fig. 1: Cumulative distributions when q = 6
Fig.2: Cumulative distributions when q = 15
Figures 1 and 2 shed some light about the e¤ects of  and q on rmsprice decisions under
IPP, when  > b. When the share of L-type consumers in the market is su¢ ciently high, for
instance  = 0:8; FA [p(x)] < FB [p(x)], that is FA rst-order stochastically dominates FB: In
this case, pA(x) is stochastically larger than pB(x); because it assumes large values with higher
probability. Thus, on average rm A charges higher prices than its competitor to consumers
located at x < 12 : Additionally, considering the mass point, the greater is the size of the L-type
segment in the market, the higher is the probability of rm A charging the highest price to
L-type consumers. The same happens when q falls. When  > q2(q 1) ; from the expression of
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the mass point we observe that @m@q < 0; suggesting that the lower is the demand heterogeneity
in the market (lower q), the higher is the probability of rm A charging price (x) to a consumer
located at x: The reverse happens when q2q 1 <  <
q
2(q 1) :
When the proportion of low demand consumers is not su¢ ciently high, for instance  = 0:6;
there is no stochastic order between FA and FB; the mass point is smaller, and rms compete
more aggressively for each consumer. Average prices fall.
Regarding the e¤ect of consumer preferences on rmsprice decisions, it follows that Fi [p(x)] <
Fi [p(x)] with 0  x < x < 12 ; i = A;B: As expected, in its strong market, rm A charges on
average higher prices to consumers with small x (x close to zero) than to consumers with x
close to 12 : As explained before, in its weak market, rm B charges on average higher prices to
consumers with small x (x close to zero) than to consumers with x close to 12 :
6.1.1 Prot e¤ects
We can now try to provide an answer to our initial question: Can personalized pricing be a
winning strategy for practice rms?
As stated by Zhang (2009), here the answer to this question is also it depends. Specically,
answering Yesor Nodepends on (i) the share of Low and High demand customers in the
market () and (ii) the level of heterogeneity in purchase quantities (q).
We rst compare prots with di¤erent price discrimination schemes. The next proposition
summarizes our main ndings.
Proposition 6 (Prots with di¤erent price discrimination schemes):
(i) Prots with group pricing are always above their counterparts with imperfect and perfect
personalized pricing.
(ii) When  < b with b = q2q 1 , prots are higher with perfect personalized pricing than
with imperfect personalized pricing.
(iii) When  > b; prots are higher with perfect personalized than with imperfect personalized
pricing as long as q2q 1 <  <
2q
3q 2 (with q > 2): In contrast, if  >
2q
3q 2 then prots are greater
with imperfect personalized pricing than with perfect personalized pricing.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Next we compare prots under the di¤erent price discrimination strategies with prots un-
der uniform pricing. As mentioned before, moving from UP to GP (the less demanding price
discrimination scheme in terms of information) is always a winning strategy for practice rms.
Additionally, it is important to stress that when the proportion of Low and High volume custom-
ers in the market is equal (i.e.,  = 12), in comparison to uniform pricing, any price discrimination
strategy based on data about consumer preferences is never a winning strategy, because rms
prots fall when moving from UP to IPP or PPP.
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In contrast, when there are su¢ ciently more L than H type consumers in the market, and de-
mand heterogeneity is su¢ ciently high, then the access to data about consumerspreferences for
personalized pricing schemes can, indeed, be a winning strategy for practice rms in competitive
markets. The next proposition summarizes our main ndings.
Proposition 7 (Comparison of prots under UP and PP schemes):
(i) When  < b with b = q2q 1 ; IPP always reduces prots in comparison to UP.
(ii) When  > b; then
u   IPPi =
(; q)
(+ q2(1  )) (+ q(1  ))
with
(; q) =  3q (5q   3) (q   1) + 2
 




 7q + 11q2   1

+ 3q3:
Then when q and  are su¢ ciently high (; q) < 0, suggesting that IPP boosts prots in
comparison to UP.







UP are above prots with PPP.
(iv) If heterogeneity in purchase quantities is su¢ ciently high, i.e. q > 2
p
2+3; in comparison




 6q + q2 + 1

and 2 = 14(q 1)

3q   1 +
p
 6q + q2 + 1

. The reverse happens when b <  < 1: As q !
+1, 1 ! 0:5 and 2 ! 1:
Proof. See the Appendix.
In order to shed light about our main prot results, Figures 3, 4 and 5 plot three pictures
based on di¤erent levels of demand heterogeneity, namely q = f2; 6; 15g.
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Fig.3: Prots when q = 2 Fig.4: Prots when q = 6
Fig.5: Prots when q = 15
The gures presented above conrm that if rms have only information about consumer
demand types, and price discrimination based on this information (GP) is permitted, prots are
always above their counterparts with UP and IPP/PPP.
Practice rms are also better o¤ under UP than under any form of personalized pricing when
(i) the share of H-type consumers is higher than the share of L-type consumers, and/or (ii) when
the heterogeneity in purchase quantity is su¢ ciently low. Thus our analysis complements the
existing theoretical models. As aforementioned, when there is no demand heterogeneity in the
market; i.e., q = 1, and all rms have the required data to engage in personalized pricing,
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the intensity of price competition for each consumer increases, and prots fall (Thisse and
Vives (1988)). The same happens in this model heterogeneity of demand is low and when the
proportion of H-type (L-type) consumers in the market is su¢ ciently high (low).
Our analysis o¤ers new insights when the proportion of H-type consumers in the market falls
and they demand increasingly more units. In this situation, in comparison to UP, rms might
be better o¤ under IPP or PPP. The pictures show that IPP is the worst strategy for industry
prots when the proportion of H-type consumers in the market is su¢ ciently high. In this case,
under IPP rms quote lower personalized prices to L and H type consumers with preference
x: When PPP is permitted, in comparison to IPP, rms can recognize L and H types. Hence,
although they charge the same price to H-type consumers, they can charge higher prices to
L-type consumers. In contrast, when the proportion of H-type consumers further reduces such
that  > b, and demand heterogeneity is high enough, due to insu¢ cient information (i.e, no
information about demand types), IPP can act to soften price competition in the market and
boost industry prots, either in comparison to UP or PPP.
Summing up, in the context of this model GP is the most protable price discrimination
strategy. Apart from it, when we compare UP, IPP and PPP, we conclude that a relatively
small share of H type consumers, purchasing a su¢ cient high number of units, might allow rms
to compete with personalized prices in a protable way.
7 Final remarks
This paper complements the extant literature looking at the protability of personalized pricing
in oligopolistic markets. Like most of the literature, consumers are heterogeneous with respect
to their preferences for rms. However, we incorporate another simple but important feature
of customer heterogeneity in several markets, by assuming that not all customers are equally
valuable to rms. In other words, we assume that some consumers purchase more than others.
As stated by Shin and Sudhir (2010), widespread empirical support in various categories conrms
the 80/20 rule, i.e., the idea that a small share of customers contributes to most of the purchases
and prot in a category.
Our model o¤ers a reasonable abstraction of many real-world markets in which consumer
tastes and consumer heterogeneity in demand are important features (e.g. airlines, grocery
stores, hotels, department stores, retail) and which businesses use data for price discrimination
purposes.
We show that (i) the heterogeneity in consumer value, (ii) the share of L/H demand con-
sumers and (iii) the type of data available for pricing, play an important role on the prot e¤ects
of price discrimination. When rmsdata fully reveals consumer demand types (vertical inform-
ation), but gives no information about consumer tastes (horizontal information), businesses can
only employ group pricing. This is always a winning strategy. Indeed, in comparison to UP,
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IPP and PPP, in this model GP is the more protable price discrimination strategy.
When rmsdata fully reveals consumer tastes but discloses no information about demand
types, rms can quote prices on an individual basis and, under certain market conditions, imper-
fect personalized pricing may yield higher or lower prots than uniform pricing. More specically,
in markets where the heterogeneity in purchase quantity is su¢ ciently high and the proportion of
Low (High) demand consumers is su¢ ciently high (low), in comparison to UP, prots are higher
under imperfect personalized pricing. This suggests that in comparison to no discrimination, the
existence of a small share of H-type consumers allows businesses to get greater prots when they
employ imperfect personalized pricing. The reverse happens, however, when the proportion of
High demand customers in the market is greater than the proportion of Low demand consumers.
Additionally, our analysis also suggests that if rms have access to perfect information about
demand types and tastes, then, perfect personalized pricing can also be a winning strategy in
comparison to UP and IPP. For instance, when q = 15; prots are greater under PPP than
under UP as long as 0:58 <  < 0:99: And they are greater under PPP than under IPP as long
as 0:52 <  < 0:70: This simple example suggests that when q = 15; in comparison to UP and
IPP, PPP is better for prots as long as 0:58 <  < 0:70: If q = 15 and the share of H-type
consumers is 20%, then rms are better o¤ under PPP than under UP, however IPP is more
protable than PPP. If the share of H-demand consumers is rather 35% of the market, then
prots are higher under PPP than under UP or IPP.
Notwithstanding the model addressed in this paper is far from covering all complex aspects
of real markets, it provides a theoretical strategic rationale for the increasingly use of consumer
data for personalized pricing strategies only possible in the context of digital markets. In light
of this, we show that when consumer heterogeneity is su¢ ciently high, the existence of a small
share of H-type consumers can help businesses to employ personalized pricing as a winning
strategy, even if they are symmetric. Therefore, our model o¤ers critical information about
the value of using consumer data for personalized pricing in oligopolistic markets relatively well
represented by the features of this model. As the theoretical model provides empirically testable
hypotheses, we hope it can be used for further empirical research.
Appendix
This Appendix collects the proofs that were omitted from the text.
Proof of Proposition 1: Under uniform pricing each rm prot is
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Consider the case of rm A. From the FOC we obtain:
pA =
 
q +   q+ pB + q2pB   q2pB

2  2q2+ 2q2









+ q2(1  ) :
Proof Proposition 2: Under group pricing considering rm each rm sets a price to a H
and a L type consumer, respectively denoted pHi and p
L
i ; i = A;B: Using equations (3) and (4)












































Proof of Corollary 1: It is straightforward to see that pu   pL = q (  1) q 1
+q2(1 ) < 0
and pu pH =  q 1
q(+q2(1 )) > 0: Thus all consumers pay lower prices under uniform than under
group pricing. In line of this personalized pricing based on consumer heterogeneity boosts both
rms prots at the expense of consumer surplus (GP   u =  (1  ) (q 1)
2
+q2(1 ) > 0):
Proof of Proposition 3: With no loss of generality consider rms price decisions to
consumers locate at x  12 : If pA(x) =
(x)
q retailer A serves for sure all consumer types at x
and its prot from consumers located at x is
A(pA(x); pB(x)) =
(x) [+ (1  ) q]
q
If rm A deviates to pdA(x) = (x) its guarantee prot is 
d
A((x)) = (x): Thus, rm A
has an incentive to deviate to price (x) as long as (x) > (x)q [+ (1  ) q] ; which implies
 > q2q 1 . As long as  
q
2q 1 there is a pure strategy equilibrium in prices with pA(x) =
(x)
q
and pB(x) = 0 for all consumers with x  12 : In this case overall prots are







+ (1  ) q
4q
:
Proof of Proposition 4: When  > q2q 1 following a reasoning similar to Narasimhan
(1988) we can show that a PSNE in prices fails to exist. There is however a MSNE the proof
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of which is done by construction. With no loss of generality consider rmsprice behavior to
consumers located at x  12 : Note that the minimum price rm A is willing to charge in an
attempt to serve all consumers in its strong market should satisfy the condition pAmin(+ (1 
)q) = (x). This yields:
pAmin =
(x)
+ (1  )q :
Firm B takes into account rm As price behavior and so by pricing slightly below pAmin  (x)q
it can sell to the H-type consumers. Thus pBmin = pAmin   (x)q . For a consumer located at
x  12 in the MSNE we must observe:























= pBmin(x)(1  )q: (33)






pA(x)q(1 ) ; which yields
FB (pA(x)) =
(+ (1  )q)








From FB (pmin(x)) = 0 and FB (pmax(x)) = 1 we get
pBmin(x) =
(x)







(q   1) (x):






= 1  pBminpB(x) : This yields
FA [(p(x)] = 1  (x)

q +   2q
( (x) + p(x)q) ( q   + q)

From FA (pAmin(x)) = 0 we get
pAmin =

+ q (1  ) :
There is a mass point at (x) equal to
m = 1  FA((x)) =
q2 (1  )
(q   1) (q(1  ) + )
Note that m < 1 as long as  > q2q 1 which is true under our initial assumption. Therefore:
FA(p(x)) = 1 
(2q   1)  q
(p(x)q   (x)) (q(1  ) + )(x)
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with a mass point m = q
2(1 )
(q 1)(q(1 )+) :











(1  ) ((2q   1)  q)
+ q(1  ) ;








(1  ) ((2q   1)  q)
+ q(1  ) :
Firm A expected prots for a consumer with preference x located at x  12 (As strong
market) is:
sA(x) = (x)













(1  ) ((2q   1)  q)




Proof of Proposition 6:





+ (1  ) q
4q







(1  ) ((2q   1)  q)




The proof of part (i) is straightforward, as prots with IPP and PPP are always below 12 : To
prove part (ii) note that when  < b : IPP   PPP =   14q (q   1) < 0 which is always true
for q > 1: Look next at part (iii). When  > b with b = q2q 1 :
IPP   PPP = 1
4
(1  ) 3q  2q   2
+ q(1  )
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then IPP   PPP > 0 as long as  > 2q3q 2 : The reverse happens, i.e., 
IPP   PPP < 0 when
q
2q 1 <  <
2q
3q 2 :
Proof of Proposition 7:





+ q2(1  ) : (34)
When  < b; IPP = +(1 )q4q thus





(2q   1) + q2(1  )
q (+ q2(1  ))

> 0:
To prove parte (ii) when  > b :
u   IPPi =
 3q (5q   3) (q   1) + 2
 




 7q + 11q2   1

+ 3q3




 3q (5q   3) (q   1) + 2
 








u   IPPi > 0 when (; q) > 0
When for instance q = 2 then we need to impose that  > 23 : In this range for ; (; 2) > 0:
When q = 6 and  > 611 ; it follows that (; 6) > 0 as long as
6
11 <  < 0:7648; otherwise if
 > 0:7648 the reverse happens. When for instance q = 15 and  > 1529 ; we have that (; 15) > 0
as long as 1529 <  < 0:65 and (; 15) < 0 when 0:65 <  < 0:995:
Next we prove part (iii). It follows that u   PPP = 12
22(q 1)2 (3q 1)(q 1)+q2
+q2(1 ) : Look at
the sign of the numerator. Is has no roots when q < 2
p
2 + 3; suggesting that in this case
u   PPP > 0: In contrast when q > 2
p
2 + 3 and  > b; there are two roots: 22 (q   1)2  
 (3q   1) (q   1)+q2 < 0 as long as 1 <  < 2. Because 1 > b always holds for q > 2p2+3







 6q + q2 + 1  1








 6q + q2 + 1  1

which tends to 1 when q !1:
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